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Bitcoin is the first implementation of what has
become known as a ‘public permissionless’ blockchain.
Guaranteeing security and protocol conformity
through its elegant combination of cryptographic
assurances and game theoretic economic incentives, it
permits censorship resistant public read-write access
to its append-only blockchain database without
the need for any mediating central authority. Not
until its advent has such a trusted, transparent,
comprehensive and granular data set of digital
economic behaviours been available for public
network analysis. In this article, by translating
the cumbersome binary data structure of the
Bitcoin blockchain into a high fidelity graph
model, we demonstrate through various analyses
the often overlooked social and econometric benefits
of employing such a novel open data architecture.
Specifically we show (a) how repeated patterns
of transaction behaviours can be revealed to link
user activity across the blockchain; (b) how newly
mined bitcoin can be associated to demonstrate
individual accumulations of wealth; (c) through
application of the naïve quantity theory of money that
Bitcoin’s disinflationary properties can be revealed
and measured; and (d) how the user community
can develop coordinated defences against repeated
denial of service attacks on the network. All of the
aforementioned being exemplary benefits that would
be lost with the closed data models of the ‘private
permissioned’ distributed ledger architectures that
are dominating enterprise level development due to
existing blockchain issues of governance, scalability
and confidentiality.
1. Introduction and Prior Work
Bitcoin’s release in 2009 [1] heralded the introduction of
a novel distributed database technology that has become
known as blockchain. Reaching a fault tolerant
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consensus on state has been a well researched distributed systems problem. But reaching such
a consensus without the need for any centralized identity management system is the solution
to this surprisingly overlooked problem that the invention of Bitcoin has presented. Bitcoin’s
resilience relies upon public read and write access to its blockchain database where such a
distributed store of publicly shared data presents many opportunities for increased access,
transparency and trust without the need for any further reconciliation effort between users
of the shared data. The Bitcoin protocol specification is defined by its open-source reference
implementation and its precise workings are well explained in many sources such as Bonneau et
al. [2] or Antonopoulos [3]. However, these pseudonymous trustless blockchain architectures as
currently implemented in Bitcoin or Ethereum come with significant challenges, such as their
inherent difficulty to scale and their leakage of (albeit obfuscated) private information.
In a fully trustless blockchain system, each participant must verify the activity of every
other participant - an inbuilt O(n2) scalability problem. It is well known that the Bitcoin
network currently suffers confirmation delays and becomes congested at ~4 transactions per
second (tps) and the Ethereum network becomes congested at ~17tps (compared to Paypal
which claims to handle 450tps on Cybermondays or Visa which claims to have tested up to
56,000tps). Proposals to scale Bitcoin to these global levels in the future involve a compromise
of its fully trustless nature by maintaining the original blockchain as a consolidated settlement
layer only, and introducing a second layer process of off-chain transaction verification between
trusted centralised counterparties known as the Lightning Network.
The leakage of private information on the Bitcoin blockchain is well studied and has, to date,
focussed on the deanonimization of pseudonymous bitcoin transactions. Reid & Harrigan[4]
first took the approach of associating bitcoin address tokens to unique users by splitting the
blockchain into two graph structures: a transaction network and an address network, using
the former to abstract the latter into an implied user network. Both Androulaki et al.[5] and
Meiklejohn et al.[6] took a similar approach by splitting the blockchain into two graphs and using
the associative information leaked by the shared inputs of multi-input transactions, along with
information derived from ‘shadow’ addresses used for change amounts, to derive a consolidated
graph of unique entity transactions. Ron & Shamir[7] also collapsed the transaction and address
graphs into an abstract entity graph whose purpose was to explore its network properties rather
than deanonimization. The literature in this area has become notably more sparse as the data
has grown to become more unwieldy. Such established privacy deficiencies have however led
to the development of more private systems such as ZCash that, whilst maintaining a public
permissionless blockchain architecture, employs a zero knowledge protocol to guarantee privacy,
albeit at increased computational cost. However whilst ZCash aims for the computationally
secure secrecy of shielded transactions, Qesnelle [8] showed how its transactions can be associated
together through behavioural patterns of usage.
To mitigate against these scaling and privacy problems, whilst also avoiding the additional
resources required for zero knowledge protocols or the expensive consensus mechanisms
associated with public permissionless architectures, enterprise-level blockchain solutions
currently in development are gravitating towards a private permissioned blockchain model of
walled-garden data-silos with access controlled by gatekeepers, as shown by the brief review
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. At the enterprise level, there is a clear design evolution toward a private permissioned distributed
ledger architecture for reasons of governance, commercial confidentiality, regulatory compliance and
computational simplicity.
Clearmatics Limited public information although the Utility Settlement Coin project is
limited to 12 members of a private consortium. a
Corda (R3) “Corda is designed for semi-private networks in which admission requires
obtaining an identity signed by a root authority...There is no global broadcast
at any point.” b
Digital Asset
Holdings
“The Digital Asset Platform Distributed Ledger layer is a permissioned ledger
accessible (for reading or writing) only by known and pre-approved parties.”c
Hyperledger
Fabric
“Hyperledger Fabric is a platform for distributed ledger solutions...is private
and permissioned...the members of a Hyperledger Fabric network enrol through
a Membership Service Provider.” d
Hyperledger
Sawtooth
“Hyperledger Sawtooth is an enterprise blockchain platform for building
distributed ledger applications and networks...Sawtooth is built to solve the
challenges of permissioned (private) networks.” e
Monax “Monax was the first to market with a permissionable blockchain which
kick started enterprise interest...Permissioned blockchain networks differ from
unpermissioned blockchain networks solely based on the presence of an access
control layer built into the blockchain nodes.” f
ahttps://www.clearmatics.com/utility-settlement-coin-pioneering-form-digital-cash/
bhttps://docs.corda.net/_static/corda-technical-whitepaper.pdf
chttp://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Digital%20Asset%20Platform%20-%20Non-technical%20White%20Paper.pdf
dhttps://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/blockchain.html#what-is-hyperledger-fabric
ehttps://sawtooth.hyperledger.org/docs/core/releases/latest/introduction.html
fhttps://monax.io/use_cases/finance/
These commercial private permissioned approaches, however, negate many of the prime
benefits of blockchain technology: namely the trust, transparency and socio-econometric benefits
of an open data model, some of which we demonstrate here.
In this article we demonstrate the full advantage presented by the open data nature of
the Bitcoin blockchain: never before has a financial transaction data set of such granularity
and longevity been available for public study. We present our exploration of this open data
to develop the new field of ‘blockchain analytics’ in order to understand dynamic behaviours
within blockchain systems. By modelling the cumbersome native blockchain data as a high
fidelity graph described in Section 2, we demonstrate how traversals of the public Bitcoin data
set can derive socially useful personal and econometric information not envisaged by the original
data model. In Section 3 we make the first attempt to visualize and detect associated patterns
of transactional behaviour across the entire blockchain using a path dependent query facilitated
only by the adoption of the graph model we describe. We then deploy our graph in consideration
of the ‘coinbase’ transactions of each block: transactions specially crafted by the successful miner
creating new amounts of bitcoin awarded to themselves as a reward for their validation work
and the method by which the bitcoin economy is inflated. Through a combinatorial analysis
of coinbase-spending transactions and their disposable extranonce bytes buried deep in the
coinbase raw data, Section 4 shows how confidence in wealth accumulation attributed to the
founder and early adopters can be increased. In Section 5 we develop a simple measure to explore
the velocity of circulation within the bitcoin economy and examine its impact on future price
moves. We round off our set of analyses in Section 6 by demonstrating how transaction patterns
associated with denial of service attacks on the bitcoin network can be identified and used by
the community to defend against such attacks.
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In conducting these analyses we highlight examples of the transparent benefits of the public,
yet secure, open data model that blockchain technology can afford, which would be lost in any
private permissioned blockchain implementation.
2. High Fidelity Graph Model
The core of the Bitcoin system is the blockchain: a continuously appended publicly distributed
database storing immutable, verified records of all bitcoin transactions since system inception. A
copy of this data structure is stored and grown locally by each full network peer in a sequential
series of proprietary format binary data files exemplified by the de facto reference implementation
of the Bitcoin protocol. Whilst the raw blockchain presents a complete and granular transactional
data set for analysis, the binary and sequential nature of this unindexed data makes direct
analysis impossible and we must look for an appropriate secondary data store informed by the
structure of the data itself. To appreciate the task at hand, an example dissection of a block of
this raw binary data with its non-trivial encapsulation, lack of primary keys, implicit metadata
and heterogeneous byte ordering is presented at Appendix A.
We now turn to look at the relationships presented by the components of the data set. The
integrity of the blockchain is predicated upon the computational work done by the miners in
solving each block, adding upon the work having already been expended in solving the previously
mined block, and each other block before it. Thus each new block is related to each prior block
in the chain. Each valid transaction broadcast into the system becomes related to the particular
block into which it is first successfully mined. Furthermore each transaction is composed of any
number of inputs and outputs, and each input is related to a corresponding and pre-existing
unspent output belonging to its own transaction and block, ordered at a prior point in the
blockchain. Each spending output/input pair is also necessarily related to one or more bitcoin
addresses representing the public key component of the private key required to authorise a change
of ownership. Each output records an amount of bitcoin and a cryptographic challenge expressed
in an executable, stack-based script which is required to be married to the cryptographic solution
contained in a corresponding script of the input to the valid spending transaction. There is no
limit to the number of transactions that miners may decide to include in a block, but historically
an arbitrary limit on the size of data in a block has applied to prevent abuse of the system
(originally 32MB, reduced to 1MB in 2010, and a cap of similar order exists currently after the
introduction of Segregated Witness).
This unstructured tangle of data relationships between blocks, transactions, inputs, outputs
and addresses naturally lends itself to a graph representation for efficient query traversal
and pattern recognition. Indeed previous work has analysed sub-graphs of the full data set,
particularly with regard to the associations of identities through the abstracted relationships
between addresses and transactions [4–6]. For the purposes of knowledge discovery we propose
the graph model described in Figure 1, which refrains from abstracting information away and
retains the full fidelity of the raw binary data of the blockchain whilst making for efficient query
traversals that would be computationally limiting for a tabular relational database. Also stored
in our graph model (not shown in Figure 1) are vertices to represent each of the data files and
the corresponding byte offset of each block and transaction within those files for easy recourse
to the raw binary data and a graphical time tree to enable temporal analyses. The graph was
implemented in the popular open source graph database Neo4j Community Edition.
5rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.open
sci.0000000
............................................................
Figure 1. Example portion of the graph model of the Bitcoin blockchain showing the relationships between
blocks, transactions, their inputs, outputs and associated addresses. The figure shows the source and
destination components reflecting the spending of B61 in the second transaction mined into Block#496,
whose identifying hash is highlighted in red.
Implementation
The first step in implementing the graph model was to parse the raw binary data files, each
sequentially containing around 128MB of blockchain data such as that at Appendix A. To this
end we wrote a custom C++ parser to consume and quickly deserialize the binary data files in
parallel on a 400 core HPC cluster[9] into an intermediate format in preparation for import into
Neo4j.
The period of the blockchain data in which we are interested is from its genesis, to shortly after
the second halving of the block reward (each halving event occurring according to the Bitcoin
protocol every 210,000 blocks). Constrained by resources we arbitrarily chose to model 425,000
blocks given the second halving event occurred shortly before at Block#420,000, therefore
extracting almost 8 years of transactional data to 13 August 2016. In our particular local
copy of the blockchain, Block#425,000 was written into the data file blk00596.dat, standing
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atop an accumulation of 80GB of raw data files. The files naturally exhibit data parallelism
since the blocks and transactions they contain are unique and relate to each other through
unique identifiers. It is only the address data that occurs across multiple files, and this can be
rationalised in a simple post-processing step to remove data duplication.
Summary statistics of the scope of the resulting graph are shown in Table 2, which can
be considered a large graph on which to compute. The Neo4j instance was run on a 12core
virtual machine with 64GB RAM, with the allocated heap space configured to sustain concurrent
operations at 16GB, and 24GB allocated for the page cache. Inevitably the memory available
for the page cache results in a performance degradation due to swapping of data from disk, but
to avoid this would have required a recommended 595GB of RAM for the cache to hold the
entire graph resident in memory.
Table 2. Summary statistics of vertices in the graph model.
Number of Blocks 425,000
Number of Transactions 148,967,063
Number of Inputs 386,925,089
Number of Outputs 428,714,233
Number of Addresses 196,560,158
Data size binary (MB) 79,924
Data size Neo4j (MB) 519,792
In the following sections we demonstrate how such a granular graph model can be traversed
and interrogated to reveal less obvious insights into the relationships within the Bitcoin data
set.
3. The Bitcoin Blockchain: A Visual History
Our aim in this section was to stress the graph database with a single query that would be
forced to touch most vertices in the graph, and in so doing to create the first visualization of
patterns of activity across the whole blockchain.
The query considers each input to each transaction in each block, and asks from which
historical block did each input amount of bitcoin originate? This allows us to inspect the source
block (and approximately therefore the time at which it last changed hands) of each amount
of bitcoin transacted in each block, which allows the examination of anomalous patterns of
behaviour and as we will see in Section 5 to explore the velocity of circulation characteristics
within the Bitcoin economy.
Referring to Figure 1 it is easy to see how this query is built in the pattern matching query
language ‘Cypher’ native to Neo4j, as shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Cypher graph query touching all vertices to visualize source/destination flows between blocks
across the entire blockchain.
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Figure 3. Full Bitcoin blockchain visualization as an adjacency matrix representation (edge-weighted by
colour) of the flow of bitcoin amounts between all blocks of the entire Bitcoin blockchain to Block#425,000,
designed for interrogation on our 130 megapixel data visualization facility, a navigable interactive version
of which is available at https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~dmcginn/adjmat.html
In order to avoid self-edges, we do not consider newly generated coinbase transactions nor
high frequency transactions whose inputs point to transactions within the same block. We also
normalize the amounts of bitcoin to be expressed as the percentage contribution to the whole
amount transacted within a block in order to account for large changes in volumes transacted
over time.
Since the Bitcoin blockchain of transactions is a directed acyclic graph it naturally lends itself
to an adjacency matrix representation, and since we only consider inputs from transactions prior
to the current block, it takes a strictly upper triangular form. We can now visualize this strictly
upper triangular adjacency matrix, with a logarithmically coloured heat-map by the percentage
contribution to each block, as shown in Figure 3.
Visualizing transfers of value between blocks on the blockchain as such an edge weighted
adjacency matrix reveals several interesting features, which are better explored with the
interactive zoom features mentioned in the caption to Figure 3. Primarily note the ‘heat’ along
the diagonal. This shows that the highest percentage of value transferred into each new block
originates from bitcoins that were last transacted in very recent blocks, and thus the velocity of
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bitcoins in circulation is high: bitcoins are predominantly transacted and churned in relatively
short periods of time and this econometric feature is explored further in Section 5.
We can also notice distinct horizontal linear features which represent a single block into
which many previous amounts of bitcoin are consolidated and also distinct vertical features
which represent a block from which many amounts of bitcoin are distributed. Given the density
of data and the space available here, these features are most notable in the sparseness of earlier
blocks, particularly before the first distributive explosion around Block#120,000. However if
we closely examine even recent blocks using our interactive tool, these horizontal and vertical
patterns are still present in the data.
This allows us to speculate that transactions associated with repeated horizontal or vertical
patterns in close proximity are associated behaviours, controlled by one actor. These are
highlighted as repeated ‘DNA sequences’ of transactional behaviour in Figure 3 and are present
throughout the blockchain. Quantifying these relationships with a mutual similarity measure
between blocks and associating transactions to incidences of high similarity are topics for future
work. We can already see though how speculative relationships from such transactions can be
related to a controlling entity in our high fidelity graph to increase confidence in any transaction
linkability or deanonimization tasks we may be interested to perform.
We can also employ the visualization to backtrack from a particular block on the diagonal
across repeated horizontal consolidations and vertical distributions in a stepwise manner down
through the blockchain to examine the primary source of such behaviour and look to correlate
such anomalous behaviour with external events.
4. Identity Leakage through Data Exhaust
In this section we dig deep into the raw binary data, and it may be opportune to review the
protocol dissection in Appendix A for details of a block’s extranonce field. We employ the open
data derived graph database described in Section 2 to expand upon a prior primary analysis by
Lerner [10] of information leakage through parsing up to 4 potentially random functional bytes
of a comment field, powerfully exposing the likely accumulation of bitcoin wealth by the very
first miners, predominantly the single entity by the name of Satoshi Nakamoto [1].
As described in Bonneau [2], the mechanism of Bitcoin mining is to be the first to propose
to the network a block of transaction data whose summary block header has a double SHA-256
message digest that is arithmetically less than the then current difficulty criterion. Given the
nature of this problem, miners adopt a brute force approach by repeatedly testing the message
digest of different block headers against the appropriate difficulty criterion. The 80 byte block
header contains 6 pieces of summary information about the set of transactions contained therein,
4 of which are fixed for any given set of immutable transaction data and network consensus.
Thus the only variables at the control of the miner in order to generate differing message
digests between brute force attempts are the nonce and timestamp fields in the header, and
indirectly by changing the set of transaction data, changing the set’s Merkle root which is
also referenced as a field in the block header (essentially a unique fingerprint of the particular
ordered set of transactions contained within the block and the mechanism by which immutability
is guaranteed).
Changing the transaction data set is the least preferred option since calculating its new
Merkle root, validating new transactions for inclusion or removing transactions either reduce
mining efficiency or reduce mining fees. The Unix timestamp can be changed within bounds
approximately -1/+2 hours of the current time, but the obvious field to test against is the 4-
byte nonce field dedicated for this purpose. However given the solution space is therefore limited
to 232 possible message digests, it is feasible that all possibilities can be exhausted by brute force
within a very short period of time, where a block header solution that satisfies the difficulty
criterion is not found.
To overcome this limitation it has been customary since the genesis block for miners to include
up to four bytes of ‘extranonce’ data in the redundant input field to their coinbase transaction of
9rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.open
sci.0000000
............................................................
each block (since this first transaction of each block represents newly generated bitcoins awarded
to the miner and requires no inputs). This extranonce complements the primary nonce data of
the block header. By changing this arbitrary little-endian data included within this free-form
comment field outside of the formal protocol, the whole transaction set’s Merkle root is changed
yet all transactions remain valid and thus a new round of 232 attempts can be made at finding
a solution to the block header. If a miner simply increments the extranonce on the overflow of
each round of 232 unsuccessful primary nonce solution attempts, then once published in a block
on success, the extranonce can be considered to represent a slow real-time clock signal from that
particular miner.
The observation that a seemingly unimportant four bytes of incremental extranonce data in
the general exhaust of operation actually represents a slow real-time clock of a particular miner’s
operation is the foundation of Lerner’s 2013 analysis. It was shown that the value of each block’s
incremental extranonce against its time of mining (assuming constant computational mining
power) should result in a constant gradient relationship indicative of a particular miner. Figure 4
replicates and expands upon Lerner’s work, the bottom half showing the same obvious straight
line relationships of blocks mined by particular miners, infrequently resetting the extranonce to 0.
Blocks mined by a particular miner using an infrequently resetting, non-randomised extranonce
all lie on the same positively sloping line. The slope (assuming all miners are searching the same
primary 232 nonce space) is indicative of the rate of successful block solutions, a direct measure
of computational mining power and another signature of associated identity.
Figure 4. Plots showing heights at which each block’s coinbase was first spent (top) and the extranonce
value used (bottom), coloured by spent height (including unspent). Note the constant gradient incremental
extranonce features identifying discrete continuous mining operations, highlighted in red when combined
with simultaneous spending data.
We extend Lerner’s analysis and add to it with a traversal of the graph model to show
in which block the generated bitcoins under consideration were first spent, and colour the
points according to this block height (top of Figure 4). This reveals further patterns of identity
associations, namely the obvious difference between spent and unspent coinbase transactions
and those coinbase transactions which were all spent at the same time. In this way even miners
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of low computational power with sparse extranonce data points that don’t extend into a straight
line above the extranonce noise can be further associated together by the linear consolidation of
coinbase transactions being spent at the same time (see example highlighted in red in Figure 4).
There are four reasons that we terminate this analysis so early at Block#80,000:
• The linear features are less clear to demonstrate at larger scale given limited space here.
• More miners over time result in progressively noisier incremental data.
• The free-form nature of the coinbase field becomes more difficult to parse as participants
diverge from the initial reference schema (e.g. one can witness similar incremental
behaviours using sequential quotations from the Bible, which whilst leaking the same
information are significantly more difficult to plot than integers!)
• Awareness of this information leakage encouraged adoption of extranonce randomization.
5. Monetary Supply Disinflation and Velocity of Circulation
It is well known that bitcoins come into existence as a reward to miners for ensuring system
integrity through competing in the mining puzzle. Coin creation is famously at a geometrically
reducing rate, halving every four years from an initial reward of B50 per block such that mining
rewards will cease when the amount reaches the smallest divisible unit around the year 2140,
at which point approximately 21 million bitcoin will be in existence. In some quarters this
fixed algorithmic coin creation has long been a major attraction of Bitcoin as a unit of money
compared to the fiat monetary system where money supply is according to the political whim
of central banks. However it has long been argued this lack of monetary expansion can be
considered deflationary, [11] since expectations of a rise in value due to restricted supply will
lead to hoarding. Having every historical transaction available for scrutiny through the open
data nature of the public Bitcoin blockchain allows us to examine this disinflationary claim.
Monetary economists such as Irving Fisher encapsulated this deflationary concept in the
equation of exchange [12] expounded in the naïve quantity theory of money:
MV = PT (5.1)
wherein changes in the monetary supply (M), such as the coin generation halvings programmed
into Bitcoin or the contrary operation of central bank quantitative easing, will have a causal
effect primarily on the level of prices (P ) if the velocity of circulation (V ) and the number of
transactions (T ) remain constant.
In the real economy, V and T are difficult to measure: V is often assumed fixed and T is
often substituted by a macro measure of national income. However now, for the first time, the
granular open data of the entire blockchain powerfully allows us to directly apply such theories
against every transaction in the Bitcoin economy.
We can see from studying the diagonal of the edge weighted adjacency matrix of amounts
flowing between blocks in Figure 3 that a large number of inputs into a block have been
transacted in the very recent past, so we start by introducing a measure of velocity of circulation.
For all m inputs into all the transactions mined in a particular block BN , we define the block’s
bitcoin dwell time DN as in Equation 5.2:
DN =
m∑
i=1
(BN − bi) ai
m∑
i=1
ai
(5.2)
where, ai is the amount of the input and bi is the block number from where the amount originates.
The dwell time can be considered the equilibrium point in time, measured in number of blocks
ago, such that the weighted amount of bitcoins transacted in a block balances the imaginary
beam depicted in Figure 5. It may not be immediately obvious but these beams are the physical
analogue of each row of data visualized in Figure 3.
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B0 BN = 496
a1=1
b1=187
a2=10
b2=248
a3=50
b3=360
D496 = 157.197 blocks
Figure 5. Example bitcoin dwell time measure, D496, for the three component input amounts to all
transactions mined in Block#496. (See Figure 1 for further details)
This dwell time measure is naturally inversely related to the velocity of circulation: the larger
a block’s dwell time, the longer transacted bitcoins in that block have been stationary and out of
circulation. Now if we look at (the log of) this dwell time measure over the entire blockchain under
consideration (Figure 6) we can see that as volumes have increased, the velocity of circulation
has reasonable variance but exhibits no accelerating or decelerating trend.
Figure 6. Bitcoin dwell time by block (log plot).
As an aside, the horizontal features observable at the beginning of the chart occur during a
period of very low volume, where many blocks had single transactions of fixed amounts from a
small number of blocks prior. In fact the restriction for a miner to wait more than 100 blocks
to spend the B50 coinbase reward can also clearly be seen in this early period.
Figure 6 shows that of the bitcoins transacted, there is no evidence of change in any hoarding
behaviour since the velocity of circulation as measured by the bitcoin dwell time also shows no
significant change, despite the two halvings of the monetary supply already experienced. In fact
if we make a linear least squares fit of the dwell time data, whilst mildly positively sloping, it only
increases by 33 blocks over the whole 425,000 block period from D0=861 blocks. Alternatively
we can say that a typical bitcoin circulating over this 7-8 year period under consideration has
been transacted approximately every six days (given the mining rate at ~144 blocks/day), and
this has remained the case since its genesis and over the two halving events experienced so far.
With this constant V in mind, referring back to the naïve equation of exchange 5.1 as a cartoon
example and noting both that the number of transactions (T ) is constrained as a constant by
12
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the currently exhibited protocol block size limit of around 1MB and that the monetary supply
(M) is reducing as programmed by the quadrennial halving events, we can thus theorize that the
prices of goods denominated in bitcoin (P ) must also tend to decrease from current expectations
in line with with the reduced monetary supply.
Have we in fact experienced this anticipated price deflation? Empirically there are very
few goods denominated in bitcoin, but we can turn to the inverse of price and look at the
purchasing power of one bitcoin. If we look to the exchange price of a bitcoin as a measure
of its purchasing power we can see it has indeed increased over the two halvings. As well as
through speculation, Bitcoin has exhibited a deflationary profile, and we can speculate that such
purchasing power increases may continue as the supply becomes ever more restricted whilst the
velocity of circulation and effective 1MB block size limit remain in effect.
It is only through the open data nature of the blockchain that anyone can generate on a
per transaction granular basis such a metric for the velocity of circulation within the Bitcoin
economy.
6. Denial of Service Attacks
In our previous work visualizing transaction patterns across the Bitcoin blockchain [13], a
particular result was the identification of programmatically generated spam transactions. In
that work we generated a real-time force directed graph of bitcoin transactions within blocks,
visualizing the relationships between transaction inputs (orange), transaction outputs (blue)
and transaction components sharing a common bitcoin address (grey). An example of the
visualization showing Block#364133 is shown in Figure 7. This block was mined in a period
where an attacker had mounted a denial of service (DoS) attack on Bitcoin, algorithmically and
cheaply generating many ‘spam’ transactions of small value to artificially fill up the blocks with
large amounts of data to push against the arbitrary the 1MB block ceiling hard coded into the
Bitcoin protocol at that time.
Figure 7. Algorithmically associated spam transactions forming the three visually anomalous ‘worm’
structures (indicated) of a DoS attack commencing in Block#364133. (McGinn et al. [13] for details.)
A cursory inspection of the anomalous worm structures in the block visualization reveals the
nature of the algorithm used to generate the spam transactions, namely many high frequency
13
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periods of anomalous degree distribution.
transactions repeatedly spending small blue outputs to 102 separate addresses in the case of the
‘fat worm’, and 11 and 15 separate addresses in the case of the two ‘thin worms’.
Knowing the primary feature of these high frequency spam transactions is their high out
degree (and later their in degree), we can deploy our high fidelity graph model to query and
explore this algorithm’s evolution. The results of this query are shown in Figure 8 which depicts,
for each block, a particular ‘heat’ according to the number of transactions of a certain (positive)
in degree and the number of transactions of a certain (negative) out degree, plotted on a log
scale. Clearly there are many regular transactions in each block of small in and out degree
hence the indeterminate and unimportant ‘heat’ along the central axis, but by observing the
clear linear structures away from the central axis it immediately becomes clear when the high
frequency algorithm of anomalously large in or out degree is in operation.
We can see from Figure 8 that the denial of service algorithm did indeed commence operation
at the time of Block#364133 visualized in Figure 7 and quickly evolved to generating at least
5 discrete structures, each with a unique but consistent out degree signature. We can also see
somewhat coordinated periods where the algorithms briefly cease operation, perhaps to recharge
funds or perhaps for overnight shutdown which could identify the timezone of the operator.
Clearly we are able to associate these transactions by their consistent anomalous structure and
coordinated start/stop behaviour. We can also determine the point at which the algorithm
ceased operation around Block#365149, almost exactly 7 days after its start. Shortly after this
transaction output algorithm’s cessation a new linear structure above the central axis emerges,
indicating a high-frequency algorithm similar in nature but instead using transaction inputs as
opposed to outputs, potentially collecting the small amounts that the previous algorithm had
distributed, minimising the cost of the attack but multiplying its effects on the network. It
can be no coincidence that such anomalous behaviour starts so soon after the cessation of the
previous pernicious algorithmic behaviour.
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Another approach performed by Baquer et al. [14] is to use a k-means clustering of spam
features. By combining approaches we would be able to increase confidence in the positive
identification of transactions related to the denial of service spam attack through the public
nature of the blockchain data, and can decorate our graph model with this additional intelligence
in order to identify addresses and behaviours which would otherwise remain hidden in the data
and can potentially be used by the community to generate heuristic defences against such attacks.
7. Conclusion & Further Work
A distributed public permissionless blockchain database such as Bitcoin securely holds
immutable records of transactional data between users. The Bitcoin blockchain is an unwieldy
data structure, large in size, lacking primary keys, of non-trivial encapsulation and heterogeneous
byte ordering, whilst demanding onward computation of inferred data. In this article we have
disentangled the cumbersome binary blockchain into a usable graph model with its associated
benefits of efficient path traversal and pattern matching isomorphisms. This work has taken full
advantage of this first example of a granular financial open data set to show some of the socially
useful analyses that can be conducted to the benefit of the system and its community of users.
Our contributions have been:
• to reveal observable patterns of linked transactional behaviour by traversing the entire
graph, producing the first visualization of the entire blockchain as an edge weighted
adjacency matrix.
• to increase confidence in the attribution of mined bitcoin to single entities by combining
existing analyses of the extranonce with a traversal of the graph to the point at which
they were first spent.
• to show econometrically a per transaction application of the quantity theory of money
to the deflationary Bitcoin economy without having to rely on traditional broad and
aggregative assumptions.
• to demonstrate how network metrics can distinguish anomalous patterns of
algorithmically generated transaction behaviour during denial of service ‘spam’ attacks.
We can now set to the task of automatically classifying these linked transactional behaviours
observed in the Bitcoin blockchain and decorate our graph with this additional intelligence.
We speculate that associating these transactions at the user level may reveal new patterns in
the data. We also look to apply the methods here to alternative blockchain databases such as
Ethereum and ZCash, developing cross-chain analytic tools. This has application in fields such
as fraud and tax investigation, the application of econometric and economic behaviour theory
and the improvement of blockchain technology in general.
However, it must be noted that a public open data architecture such as currently implemented
in Bitcoin presents challenges of privacy and scalability. Particularly at the enterprise level,
where all participants in a business network are required to be authenticated or a centralised
third party can be trusted, the issues of scale and confidentiality with these distributed ledger
technologies are being addressed by implementing walled-garden models of siloed data. In such
cases, however, the benefits of these private permissioned distributed ledger solutions over a
properly authenticated, replicated and audited traditional database remain uncertain. It is clear
though that the open data model of a public permissionless blockchain architecture presents
many often overlooked opportunities to realize additional information and value.
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A. Dissecting the Raw Binary Data: Block#170
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The graphic presented in this appendix shows the dissection of the 490 bytes of raw binary
blockchain data representing Block#170: the block into which the first ever spending transaction
between Satoshi Nakamoto and Hal Finney was mined. Every node fully participating in the
Bitcoin network carries this data, along with that of every other valid block, leading to the
robust redundancy and replication for which Bitcoin is known.
Following the colour convention of Figure 1, the block data with its 80byte header is shown
in green. Encapsulated within the block in this case are two transactions depicted in grey. The
first transaction of a block is always the coinbase transaction allocating newly minted bitcoins
to the successful miner. Each transaction is composed of orange inputs (redundant in the case of
each coinbase transaction) and blue outputs. The transaction outputs are the sockets into which
future inputs can connect, at which point they become spent. The outputs propose an amount
of bitcoin and a cryptographic challenge (pkScript) usually referencing an ECDSA public key
or its derivative hash from which the bitcoin address is further derived, shown in red. When the
output’s pkScript is combined with its corresponding spending input’s scriptSig (which contains
a DER encoded ECDSA signature over the transaction), each validating node can independently
verify that the spend was correctly authorized by knowledge of the private key corresponding
to the bitcoin address.
Particular to note is the over-normalization and lack of any primary keys directly identifying
any piece of data such as a block hash, transaction hash or bitcoin address, all to which the
data refers but must be derived from the data itself. This fact, coupled with the non-trivial
encapsulation of data of variable length and heterogeneous byte orders, leads to the result that it
is necessary to post-process the binary data files, parsing them in their entirety to extract useful
information. The need for data expansion into a secondary store for efficient query traversal
becomes obvious, and a graph structure is the natural choice.
It is curious to note that such great efforts were made in the Bitcoin protocol design
to minimise the bytes that would have to be stored in perpetuity by every fully validating
participant. Yet the fact is that it is redundant to record the public key itself on the blockchain
since ECDSA facilitates public key recovery given the signature, plain text message and nonce
used, which suggests the designer(s) weren’t fully conversant with elliptic curve cryptography
at the outset. An interesting aside is the ECDSA signature nonce must be truly random for
any address re-use as private key recovery is possible given known public keys, signatures,
corresponding plain texts and nonces [15]. Once linkability is established between a user’s
transactions through means such as those exhibited throughout this article, patterns of ECDSA
nonce use may expose a feasible attack vector.
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